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In September 2014, the World Health Organization (WHO) described West Africa’s Ebola epidemic
as “the most severe acute public health emergency seen in modern times. Never before in recorded history
has a biosafety level four pathogen infected so many people, so quickly, over such a broad geographic area,
for so long.”1 At that point, less than 7,000 individuals had been infected. By the end of the crisis in early
2016, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimate more than 28,000 confirmed, suspect,
or probable cases; 11,300 deaths; 3.5 billion USD spent on response efforts; and 2 billion USD lost in
economic activity.2 Sierra Leone accounts for roughly half of those cases and just under 4,000 deaths.
Ebola containment efforts emphasize early isolation and treatment. Yet, during the West Africa Epi-
demic the WHO assumed that many cases were never reported (Enserink 2014). Distrust deterred symp-
tomatic individuals from visiting health facilities: “Local communities were suspicious of efforts to test,
treat, and isolate patients with Ebola symptoms and engaged in practices of hiding sick family members,
running away from local communities, or attempting to manage the course of Ebola within local households
and communities” (Abramowitz et al. 2016, 24).
Post-mortems on the crisis stress that “robust community engagement” helps to build trust and en-
courage reporting (Kruk et al. 2015, e1910). To assess this oft-repeated claim, we evaluate a large-scale
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policy effort that involved the construction of Community Care Centers (CCCs) across Sierra Leone in the
midst of the country’s Ebola outbreak. CCCs where designed to alleviate fears about western medicine and
encourage reporting. Using a difference-in-differences research design, and geo-coded data on the number
of reported cases (including individuals who test negative for Ebola) in a given week and section,3 we find
that CCCs roughly triple the increase in reported cases, relative to sections without CCCs. We find substan-
tial increases in both the total number of cases, as well as the number of cases that eventually test positive
for Ebola (i.e., confirmed cases). This suggests that CCCs increased the isolation of infected patients, a
necessary step for containing the outbreak.
These results are consistent with Christensen et al. (2019), who evaluate two randomized accountability
interventions that were implemented across government-run clinics in Sierra Leone roughly one year before
the Ebola crisis. Their medium-run results from before the crisis show improvements in clinic utilization
and the perceived quality of care; amid the subsequent Ebola crisis, these treated areas also saw a large
increase in Ebola reporting.
More broadly, our findings contribute to recent work which finds that fear and distrust deter patients
from utilizing health facilities (Alsan and Wanamaker 2017; Blair, Morse and Tsai 2017; Vinck et al. 2019;
Lowes and Montero 2018).4
1. Community Care Centers (CCCs)
The initial response to the Ebola outbreak envisioned large-scale facilities, accommodating over 100 patients
and capable of enforcing strict biosafety control procedures. Yet, would-be patients viewed these treatment
centers with suspicion and refused to report, instead hiding their symptoms and potentially prolonging the
epidemic (Mokuwa and Maat forthcoming).
To allay fears and encourage reporting, UNICEF and Sierra Leone’s Ministry of Health and Sanitation
(MoHS) started to implement the CCC model in mid-October 2014 and built facilities through January.
Based on estimates from DFID, a typical CCC cost about 1 million GBP, which funds an eight-bed unit
staffed by individuals, who were often recruited from nearby communities and then trained in infection
prevention and control.5 CCCs employed community liaisons and social mobilizers to raise awareness in
surrounding areas, resolve misconceptions, and refer patients. According to Abramowitz et al. (2016, 16),
the typical message from the liaisons and social mobilizers was “CCC is where you and your loved ones
who are sick with Ebola symptoms can receive safe care closer to your home and community.”
Ebola prevalence fell from early 2015 in areas outside of the capital, Freetown. The decommissioning
3Sections are small administrative units in Sierra Leone with a median area of 40 square kilometers. Figure A.1 maps total
reported cases in the Viral Hemorrhagic Fever (VHF) database by section.
4They also relate to Bandiera et al. (2019) which finds that an empowerment program for young women in Sierra Leone increases
their capacity to cope with disruptions caused by the Ebola crisis.
5CCC staff received three days of classroom and practical training in infection prevention and control, onsite training, and two
weeks of 24-hour mentorship after the CCC opened. CCCs were then monitored three times per week. Cost estimates drawn from
https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-204896.
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of CCCs started in March 2015.
In case studies and field reports, CCCs have been heralded as a success. Michaels-Strasser et al. (2015,
361) conduct an early “rapid cross-sectional [qualitative] assessment” of 11 CCCs in December 2014, and
report that CCCs were very quickly established, delivered the expected services, and maintained essential
safety measures. Abramowitz et al. (2016) assess CCC’s toward the end of the crisis and conclude “CCCs
were an effective community-based mechanism to screen for Ebola, triage persons exhibiting signs of illness,
and isolate Ebola suspects.” (p10) And they specifically address the issue of reporting, writing “By making
Ebola care available at the community-level, fear was reduced and communities were more likely to seek
care” (p11). This finding is echoed in interviews conducted by Pronyk et al. (2016) and Mokuwa and Maat
(forthcoming).
2. Data and Research Design
We employ two sources of data. First, data on the locations of 41 CCCs from the UN Mission for Ebola
Emergency Response (UNMEER) (see Figure A.1).
Second, we construct panel data on the number of reported cases — including cases that will return
both positive and negative lab tests for Ebola — in every week and section from August 2014 through
February 2015. These case counts are derived from the Epi Info Viral Hemorrhagic Fever (VHF) database,
which comprised the primary data management system for case and contact tracing during the outbreak, im-
plemented and maintained by the Ministry of Health and Sanitation, with support from the CDC.6 Officers
employed (even prior to the crisis) by the MoHS oversaw teams of case investigators charged with following
up on suspected cases. Investigators learned about cases through walk-ins at health centers, active surveil-
lance (e.g., contact tracing), and outreach to communities (Owada et al. 2016). For each reported case, they
completed a Case Investigation Form (CIF), which included demographic (including district, chiefdom, and
village) and health information. Completed CIFs were brought back to District Ebola Response Centers and
entered by data managers in the local VHF database. Each observation in our data represents one of these
CIFs.
We geocode cases using information on individuals’ residence included in the VHF database (typically,
district, chiefdom, section and village or parish). We use a fuzzy matching algorithm (to permit alternative
spellings) to search gazetteer files of placenames in Sierra Leone, using Open Street Map (OSM, see full
geocoding protocol in the online appendix). Below we use data from 1,316 sections over 30 weeks.7 Our
main dependent variables are the count reported cases, either all cases or confirmed cases that test positive
for Ebola.
Exploiting this panel data, we employ a difference-in-differences design, estimating the differential
change in reported cases in sections that do and do not host CCCs, before and after the start of CCC imple-
6We use de-identified data (where patient names and characteristics have been redacted) from the Njala University Ebola Mu-
seum and Archive.
7We use the date when a case first appears in the VHF database to determine the week interval. Data excludes Waterloo Rural










































Figure 1: Trends in Total Cases by CCC Presence
Note: Using UNMEER data, we identify those sections that eventually contain one CCC. We then compute
the average number of total cases (logged) in sections that do and do not receive a CCC in each week from
10 August 2014 to 1 May 2015. The grey area starts with CCC implementation in mid-October 2014 and
ends with their initial decommissioning in March 2015
mentation. Specifically, we estimate two models:
yst = α+κCCCs+δPostt +βDst + εst (1)
yst = αs+ γt +βDst + εst (2)
where s ∈ {1,2, . . . ,1316} indexes sections, t ∈ {1,2, . . .30} weeks, and Dst (CCC×Postt) is an indicator
for whether a section contains a CCC after 15 October 2014, which we use to approximate the start of
implementation in “mid-October.” Equation (1) is a simple two-group-two-period model; in Equation (2)
we include section fixed effects (αs) and week fixed effects (γt). We employ several functional forms as a
robustness check, logging the counts (adding one to avoid dropping section-weeks with no cases), using a
inverse-hyperbolic sine transformation, and running a linear probability model for whether any cases were
reported (see Table B.1). Across models, we cluster our standard errors at the section level.
The key identifying assumption is that trends in the sections that do and do not host CCCs would
have remained parallel absent implementation. We bolster this assumption through a series of placebo tests
that employ data prior to implementation and look for differential pre-treatment trends in reporting (see
Table B.2).
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Total Cases Confirmed Cases
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cases
CCC × Post (Dst ) 0.544 0.544 0.129 0.129
(0.173)*** (0.176)*** (0.058)** (0.06)**
Log(Cases + 1)
CCC × Post (Dst ) 0.237 0.237 0.041 0.041
(0.056)*** (0.057)*** (0.02)** (0.02)**
Section FEs 1,316 1,316
Week FEs 30 30
Observations 39,480 39,480 39,480 39,480
Table 1: Effect of CCC on Confirmed and Total Cases
Note: Standard errors clustered on section shown in parentheses. Models 1 and 3 estimate Equation (1) using OLS; models 2 and 4 estimate
Equation (2), which includes section and week fixed effects. Each row corresponds to a different transformation of the dependent variable: raw case
counts and logged case counts (plus one). Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01.
3. Results
Our main result is apparent in Figure 1: while trends are parallel prior to CCC implementation, we see a
large uptick in reported cases (logged) in sections hosting CCCs relative to control.8 Prior to implemen-
tation, the average number of cases in sections that eventually hosted a CCC was 0.14, compared to 0.28
in control. Between 15 October 2014 and the end of February 2015, the average jumps to 0.94 in sections
hosting CCCs but increases to only 0.54 in control. That represents over a close to seven-fold increase in
sections with CCCs, compared to just a doubling in control sections. When we focus attention on confirmed
cases — which are of special interest for containment — we find the same divergent increase following the
implementation of CCCs (see Figure A.2). Yet, there is a fall off in confirmed cases across all sections in
early 2015, as Ebola prevalence fell across rural Sierra Leone and concentrated in the capital, Freetown.
Table 1 presents our estimates from Equations (1) and (2) using both total and confirmed cases as
outcome measures. We find that CCCs substantially increase reported cases, both total and confirmed cases.
This holds for both outcomes, across equations, and using different functional forms. In raw numbers, while
the number of confirmed cases actually falls by 13 percent in control sections, reports of confirmed cases
increase by over 140 percent in sections with CCCs.
We run a series of placebo tests to assess whether trends in the two groups of sections are parallel
prior to treatment (see Table B.2). These tests are consistently small in magnitude: our actual estimate is
four times larger than the maximum placebo coefficient. Field reports indicate that CCCs were not sites
of nosocomial transmission; the increase in cases reflects greater reporting, not a heightened incidence of
Ebola. Pronyk et al. (2016) argue that CCCs reduced the reproduction rate of the virus by between 13 and
32 percent.
8CCCs are not co-located with other specialized treatment facilities (e.g., Ebola Treatment Units) in the UNMEER data. Our
results are robust to dropping the one section in our sample that contains a CCC and another type of facility.
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4. Discussion
A recent report by the Lancet Global Health Commission argues that patients’ trust in providers contributes
to the resiliency of health systems. “Trust is essential for maximizing outcomes because it can motivate
active participation in care — i.e., adherence to recommendations and uptake of services, including in emer-
gencies” (Kruk et al. 2018, e1201). Effectively responding to public health crises requires not just interna-
tional coordination of humanitarian resources, but also localized efforts to engage and build confidence in
the communities most directly affected by crisis.
While this claim has featured among “lessons learned” from the West African Ebola Crisis, it has not
been rigorously evaluated. To help fill that gap, we evaluate the impacts of Community Care Centers — a
new model of crisis response that stressed community engagement, recognizing the need to overcome fears
and build trust. CCCs did not boast the equipment or specialized personnel of larger treatment centers;
the model, instead, employed local staff and community liaisons to close the physical and social distance
between patients and providers.
While CCCs have been heralded as a success, existing qualitative work and field reports do not con-
sider or attempt to estimate how the outbreak might have progressed absent the intervention. Employing
new panel data on reported cases and a difference-in-differences design, we find that CCCs dramatically
increased reporting, including by infected patients.
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Figure A.1: Map of Reported Cases and Community Care Centers
Note: Left: the number of cases (logged) by section in the Viral Hemorrhagic Fever (VHF) database main-
tained by the CDC during the Ebola crisis. Right: the locations of Community Care Centers using data from
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Figure A.2: Trends in Confirmed Cases by CCC Presence
Note: Using UNMEER data, we identify those sections that eventually contain one CCC. We then compute
the average number of confirmed cases (logged) in sections that do and do not receive a CCC in each week
from 10 August 2014 to 1 May 2015. The grey area starts with CCC implementation in mid-October 2014
and ends with their initial decommissioning in March 2015
A3
B. Appendix Tables
Total Cases Confirmed Cases
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Inverse-hyperbolic Sine(Cases)
CCC × Post (Dst ) 0.307 0.307 0.053 0.053
(0.072)*** (0.074)*** (0.026)** (0.026)**
1(Cases > 0)
CCC × Post (Dst ) 0.201 0.201 0.038 0.038
(0.041)*** (0.041)*** (0.017)** (0.018)**
Section FEs 1,316 1,316
Week FEs 30 30
Observations 39,480 39,480 39,480 39,480
Table B.1: Effect of CCC on Total Cases: Alternative Specifications
Note: Standard errors clustered on section shown in parentheses. Models 1 and 3 estimate Equation (1) using OLS; models 2 and 4 estimate Equation
(2), which includes section and week fixed effects. Each row corresponds to a different transformation of the dependent variable: inverse-hyperbolic
sine and a linear probability model. Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01.




Aug-17 Aug-24 Aug-31 Sep-07 Sep-14 Sep-21 Sep-28 Oct-05 Oct-15
CCC × 0.007 −0.006 0.048 0.031 0.038 0.060 0.060 0.048 0.237
Placebo Start
Date
(0.029) (0.022) (0.026)∗ (0.029) (0.033) (0.041) (0.050) (0.050) (0.057)∗∗∗
Section FEs 1,316 1,316 1,316 1,316 1,316 1,316 1,316 1,316 1,316
Week FEs 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 30
Observations 13,160 13,160 13,160 13,160 13,160 13,160 13,160 13,160 39,480
Table B.2: Placebo Tests for CCC Analysis
Note: Standard errors clustered on section shown in parentheses. Significance: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table displays estimates of Equation (2) using OLS, where the placebo CCC starting date is indicated in each column.
A4
C. Geo-coding Procedure
The VHF data includes information on individuals’ residences, including their district, chiefdom, and village
or parish. We use this information to place observations within sections. Our geo-location protocol involves
several steps. First, a human coder inspected and cleaned all district and chiefdom names that did not exactly
match the conventional spelling. Of 85,410 entries in the case data, we can code the chiefdom of residence
for 97% of observations.
Second, we employ fuzzy string matching to match the available village or parish names to gazetteer
files of placenames from Sierra Leone. Fortunately, in the chiefdoms that include our sample, only 14
confirmed, suspected, or probable Ebola cases do not include village or parish information.9 We employ the
gazetteer file from Open Street Map (www.openstreetmap.org/), which includes 9,975 entries, ranging
from hamlets to cities. We prefer this list to the 2004 census data from Sierra Leone, which only provides
names for around 5,000 localities. Moreover, during the Ebola epidemic, Open Street Map mounted a
humanitarian effort aimed at updating and verifying information on the locations of villages and roads in
Sierra Leone.10
Ten sample entries from OSM gazetteer file:
osm_id name coordinates
1 27565056 Freetown (-13.26802 8.479002)
2 314001434 Bo (-11.73665 7.962065)
3 314005602 Kenema (-11.18639 7.885936)
4 314007819 Koidu (-10.97163 8.642281)
5 320058940 Kambia (-12.91934 9.125073)
6 320060481 Kamakwie (-12.24125 9.496301)
7 320060535 Pujehun (-11.72124 7.356632)
8 320060540 Zimmi (-11.31032 7.312338)
9 370327499 Goderich (-13.28887 8.432966)
10 370495828 Murray Town (-13.26534 8.491613)
Fuzzy string matching calculates the string distance between each village or parish name in the VHF
data and each placename in the gazetteer file that falls within the exact same district and chiefdom.11 An
exact match returns a distance of zero; “FREE TOWN” and “FREETOWN,” for example, would return a
distance of 1. We do not match any entries with a string distance that exceeds 2.
9Of all entries in the case data that fall within the chiefdoms the include our sample, only 0.07 percent are missing an entry for
village or parish of residence.
10http://wiki.openstreetmap.org/wiki/2014_West_Africa_Ebola_Response
11We use optimal string alignment distance, a variant of the Levenshtein distance, which is commonly employed in geo-coding
algorithms.
A5
